The false idea of interest underlying this opposition has already
been criticized (See Chapter X), but some moral aspects of the
question will now be considered. A clew to the matter may be
found in the fact that the supporters of the "interest" side of
the controversy habitually use the term "self-interest." Starting
from the premises that unless there is interest in an object or
idea, there is no motive force, they end with the conclusion that
even when a person claims to be acting from principle or from a
sense of duty, he really acts as he does because there "is
something in it" for himself. The premise is sound; the
conclusion false. In reply the other school argues that since
man is capable of generous self-forgetting and even
self-sacrificing action, he is capable of acting without
interest. Again the premise is sound, and the conclusion false.
The error on both sides lies in a false notion of the relation of
interest and the self.
Both sides assume that the self is a fixed and hence isolated
quantity. As a consequence, there is a rigid dilemma between
acting for an interest of the self and without interest. If the
self is something fixed antecedent to action, then acting from
interest means trying to get more in the way of possessions for
the self -- whether in the way of fame, approval of others, power
over others, pecuniary profit, or pleasure. Then the reaction
from this view as a cynical depreciation of human nature leads to
the view that men who act nobly act with no interest at all.
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