When exercises which are
prompted by these instincts are a part of the regular school
program, the whole pupil is engaged, the artificial gap between
life in school and out is reduced, motives are afforded for
attention to a large variety of materials and processes
distinctly educative in effect, and cooperative associations
which give information in a social setting are provided. In
short, the grounds for assigning to play and active work a
definite place in the curriculum are intellectual and social, not
matters of temporary expediency and momentary agreeableness.
Without something of the kind, it is not possible to secure the
normal estate of effective learning; namely, that
knowledge-getting be an outgrowth of activities having their own
end, instead of a school task. More specifically, play and work
correspond, point for point, with the traits of the initial stage
of knowing, which consists, as we saw in the last chapter, in
learning how to do things and in acquaintance with things and
processes gained in the doing. It is suggestive that among the
Greeks, till the rise of conscious philosophy, the same word,
techne, was used for art and science. Plato gave his account of
knowledge on the basis of an analysis of the knowledge of
cobblers, carpenters, players of musical instruments, etc.,
pointing out that their art (so far as it was not mere routine)
involved an end, mastery of material or stuff worked upon,
control of appliances, and a definite order of procedure--all of
which had to be known in order that there be intelligent skill or
art.
Pages:
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320