One may learn by doing something
which he does not understand; even in the most intelligent
action, we do much which we do not mean, because the largest
portion of the connections of the act we consciously intend are
not perceived or anticipated. But we learn only because after
the act is performed we note results which we had not noted
before. But much work in school consists in setting up rules by
which pupils are to act of such a sort that even after pupils
have acted, they are not led to see the connection between the
result -- say the answer -- and the method pursued. So far as
they are concerned, the whole thing is a trick and a kind of
miracle. Such action is essentially capricious, and leads to
capricious habits. (b) Routine action, action which is
automatic, may increase skill to do a particular thing. In so
far, it might be said to have an educative effect. But it does
not lead to new perceptions of bearings and connections; it
limits rather than widens the meaning-horizon. And since the
environment changes and our way of acting has to be modified in
order successfully to keep a balanced connection with things, an
isolated uniform way of acting becomes disastrous at some
critical moment. The vaunted "skill" turns out gross ineptitude.
The essential contrast of the idea of education as continuous
reconstruction with the other one-sided conceptions which have
been criticized in this and the previous chapter is that it
identifies the end (the result) and the process.
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