Then as to what is passing
here. A year ago we probably overrated your military power. I believe
that now we most mischievously underrate it. A year ago nothing alarmed
us more than a whisper of the chance of a war with England. We talk of
one now with great composure. We believe that it would not be difficult
to throw 100,000 men upon your shores, and we believe that half that
number would walk over England or Ireland. You are mistaken if you think
that these opinions will die away of themselves, or will be eradicated by
anything but some decisive military success. I do not agree with those
who think that it is your interest that Russia should submit while
Sebastopol stands. You might save money and men by a speedy peace, but
you would not regain your reputation. If you are caught by a peace before
you have an opportunity of doing so, I advise you to let it be on your
part an armed peace. Prepare yourselves for a new struggle with a new
enemy, and let your preparations be, not only as effective as you can
make them, but also as notorious.'[1]
[Footnote 1: Note inserted by M de Tocqueville in my Journal, after
reading the preceding conversation.
Pages:
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139