As he is not to obey us, but we are to obey the law in him, our
Constitution has made no sort of provision towards rendering him, as a
servant, in any degree responsible. Our Constitution knows nothing of a
magistrate like the _Justicia_ of Aragon,--nor of any court legally
appointed, nor of any process legally settled, for submitting the king
to the responsibility belonging to all servants. In this he is not
distinguished from the commons and the lords, who, in their several
public capacities, can never be called to an account for their conduct;
although the Revolution Society chooses to assert, in direct opposition
to one of the wisest and most beautiful parts of our Constitution, that
"a king is no more than the first servant of the public, created by it,
_and responsible to it_."
Ill would our ancestors at the Revolution have deserved their fame for
wisdom, if they had found no security for their freedom, but in
rendering their government feeble in its operations and precarious in
its tenure,--if they had been able to contrive no better remedy against
arbitrary power than civil confusion. Let these gentlemen state who that
_representative_ public is to whom they will affirm the king, as a
servant, to be responsible. It will be then time enough for me to
produce to them the positive statute law which affirms that he is not.
The ceremony of cashiering kings, of which these gentlemen talk so much
at their ease, can rarely, if ever, be performed without force.
Pages:
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309