It is true, that, aided with the powers derived from force and
opportunity, the nation was at that time, in some sense, free to take
what course it pleased for filling the throne,--but only free to do so
upon the same grounds on which they might have wholly abolished their
monarchy, and every other part of their Constitution. However, they did
not think such bold changes within their commission. It is, indeed,
difficult, perhaps impossible, to give limits to the mere _abstract_
competence of the supreme power, such as was exercised by Parliament at
that time; but the limits of a _moral_ competence, subjecting, even in
powers more indisputably sovereign, occasional will to permanent reason,
and to the steady maxims of faith, justice, and fixed fundamental
policy, are perfectly intelligible, and perfectly binding upon those who
exercise any authority, under any name, or under any title, in the
state. The House of Lords, for instance, is not morally competent to
dissolve the House of Commons,--no, nor even to dissolve itself, nor to
abdicate, if it would, its portion in the legislature of the kingdom.
Though a king may abdicate for his own person, he cannot abdicate for
the monarchy. By as strong, or by a stronger reason, the House of
Commons cannot renounce its share of authority. The engagement and pact
of society, which generally goes by the name of the Constitution,
forbids such invasion and such surrender.
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